Towards a science of consciousness and towards a consciousness of science "Consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical": This is the conclusion that David Chalmers reaches in his recent book on consciousness. While agreeing with this overall conclusion, we feel compelled to more closely investigate just exactly what is included in the term "physical." Upon examining Chalmers's argument more carefully, we find that "the physical" includes an entire specification of all spatio-temporal facts AND laws. Despite the inclusion of facts AND laws in the supervenience base, Chalmers is able to effectively argue that consciousness cannot be reductively explained within that framework. This is a monumental achievement. However, in his attempt to distance himself not only from materialists but from idealists as well, Chalmers is forced to allow a trace of epiphenomenalism in his overall argument. Essentially, epiphenomenalism returns when he asserts that while "consciousness is not logically supervenient on the physical", nevertheless, "the physical domain is causally closed." Now, Chalmers is forced into this position precisely because he includes both physical facts and physical laws in his supervenience base. The status of physical law is a separate metaphysical puzzle and one suspects that Chalmers's main intent was to sidestep this puzzle in his argument regarding the non-supervenience of consciousness. Unfortunately, the assertion that "the physical domain is causally closed" directly follows from the "physical" supervenience base which includes both physical facts and laws. In recent times, the entire status of physical law has been called into question. A naive Platonist assumption regarding physical law, widely held until postmodern times, is no longer tenable. Even if we eschew both naive Platonist and naive constructivist views regarding physical law, this problem remains and is exacerbated when the scientific focus of our efforts is consciousness itself. The reason: a circularity is created when we seek a science of consciousness. Since physical law could be dependent at the very least on the collective consciousness of a community of scientists, a circular feedback loop is created between "the laws of consciousness" and the consciousness of the researchers themselves. It is important to stress that this circularity appears only when we seek a science of consciousness. Ontological and epistemological issues do not simultaneously come to the forefront when physics or biology is under investigation but cannot be avoided in the case of consciousness. In addition, these issues affect reductionists and emergentists alike. Consequently, it is surprising that recent emergentist theories of consciousness continue to avoid ontological and epistemological issues. While earlier materialist and idealist theories were at least explicit regarding their ontological and epistemological commitments, the new emergentist theories are typically tacit regarding the same. Being silent on these issues do not make the problems go away, however. Our goal in this essay has been to clearly point out the feedback loop between the laws of consciousness and the state of consciousness of the researchers embarking on that quest. This can be encapsulated into a slogan: "A science of consciousness needs a consciousness of science."